Journalism in Mexico: Anatomy of a silence

Written by Elli Kostika

As the number of journalists murdered in Mexico rose again in the summer of 2026, reporters across Mexico speak to iMEdD about navigating pressure from drug cartels and public officials, persistent impunity and, in some parts of the country, “zones of silence.” 

Carlos Castro, Roxana Guzmán, Luis Ángel López, Alex Serna, Josué Martínez, Alejandro Leyva Aguilar, Ricardo Zúñiga. Seven journalists murdered this year in Mexico — six of them in the span of just three months, between June and September, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) . These recent killings are only the latest casualties in a crisis that has been plaguing Mexico for at least two decades. Since 2006, 153 journalists have been murdered in the country, according to CPJ. In 2025, nine journalists were killed in Mexico — the second highest deathtoll in absolute terms in the world and a figure surpassed only by Gaza, as data from Reporters Without Borders (RSF) indicate.   

Indeed, these numbers are usually more akin to places that are in a conventional state of war, similar to cases like those of Yemen, Ukraine or Gaza, says Jan-Albert Hootsen, CPJ’s Mexico representative, speaking to iMEdD. “Mexico is facing a permanent freedom of expression crisis,” Hootsen tells us, noting that the latest murders are a continuation of the years-long trend of violence against Mexico’s journalists.  

There is, however, one “major caveat,” according to Hootsen: In Mexico’s recent political history, he says, violence tends to decline during the first year of a new presidency before spiking in the second, particularly against journalists and human rights defenders. With 2026 marking Claudia Sheinbaum’s second year in office, Hootsen believes the recent killings could be part of such a “second-year spike.” His hypothesis for the increase points to the relationship between organized crime groups and public officials: each new administration brings new officials, giving criminal groups an opportunity to explore the possibility of establishing working relationships with them before resorting to violence again, Hootsen believes. By the second year, these power dynamics have largely been restructured, “all the pawns have been set,” as he puts it, and violence begins to rise again. 

"In Mexico’s recent political history violence tends to decline during the first year of a new presidency before spiking in the second, particularly against journalists and human rights defenders."

Jan-Albert Hootsen, CPJ’s Mexico representative

Who is attacking Mexico’s press? 

It is those two actors that are also responsible for most of the attacks against the country’s press. While the role of Mexico’s organized crime groups is already well-known, Hootsen tells us that “public officials are very often a part of this dynamic.”  State actors were responsible for just over half of the attacks documented against the press in 2025, according to Article 19’s annual report.  

“I trust more these guys, the criminals, than the cops,” says Ulises Escamilla , a local producer and fixer living in Mexico City who has worked for international media such as the BBC and Sky News, speaking to iMEdD. “The criminals have a word, and they keep it if you keep your word,” he continues. 

Escamilla recalls being followed by a person he believes was a police officer around two years ago. At the time, Escamilla was working with VICE on a documentary about the death of Jesús Ociel Baena, Mexico’s first openly non-binary magistrate, who had been found dead at his home in the central state of Aguascalientes. The person — who had been following Escamilla for some time — disappeared when Escamilla tried to take some pictures of him. “I’m sure that in that case the government could be related to the assassination,” stresses Escamilla, who believes this was the reason he was being followed. 

Often, public officials and drug cartels operate in collusion. “In some parts of the country, it’s hard to tell where the crime organizations end and when the local authorities show up because sometimes, they’re just the same people,” says Armando Talamantes, executive director of Quinto Elemento Lab, a Mexican non-profit investigative journalism organization.  

The recent murder of journalist Roxana Guzmán in the eastern state of Veracruz earlier this summer provides an illustrative example. Four of the eight suspects arrested in connection with her murder are municipal police officers, accused of providing logistical support to the criminal organization that kidnapped the journalist on June 2, 2026 before killing her. In early August, the Veracruz Congress removed the immunity of Raúl González Martínez, the mayor of Ixhuatlán del Sureste (a town near Nanchital where Guzmán was based), clearing the way for his prosecution over his alleged role as the mastermind behind the Guzman’s abduction and murder. 

Ulises Escamilla, Mexican local producer and fixer. Photo: Courtesy of Ulises Escamilla

A 98% impunity rate 

Whether the perpetrators are public officials or drug cartels, there is one factor tying the attacks together, according to Hootsen: impunity. “What they all have in common is that these attacks occur in places where the chance that the attackers are actually punished for their crimes, is next to zero.” The numbers are staggering — about 98% of lethal crimes against the Mexican press go unpunished, Hootsen stresses, while the impunity rate is even higher for non-lethal crimes and reaches 100% when it comes to the disappearance of journalists. “Impunity incentivizes attacks against the press,” he says. 

Are Mexican authorities unable or unwilling to prosecute the aggressors? According to Hootsen “if the political will is there, the Mexican state is very capable of going after the attackers.” What causes this impunity for Hootsen is the state’s indifference, and in some cases — when public officials are involved — there is even an incentive to engage in a cover-up operation. The government is more likely to act when the attack becomes a “PR problem”. That is what happened in the case of Guzmán when the video of her abduction circulated widely in the country’s social media leading to what Hootsen calls “a firestorm in Mexican public opinion.” 

Shrinking access to information and legal pressure

Lilia Saúl Rodriguez , an investigative reporter living in Mexico City and working for Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (ΟCCRP) talks of another major challenge facing the country’s journalists: “Access to information in Mexico is becoming a dead letter,” she tells iMEdD over email. While the right to public information was expanded in the early 2000s with the approval of relevant transparency laws, the situation has since deteriorated. In late 2024 the Sheinbaum administration decided to dismantle the INAI (National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Personal Data Protection), which, as Talamantes explains, had been an independent body serving as a “referee” when state agencies refused requests for public information.

"Access to information in Mexico is becoming a dead letter"

Lilia Saúl Rodriguez, investigative reporter at OCCRP

Quinto Elemento has used freedom of information requests repeatedly. Talamantes recalls trying to obtain public documents relating to Quinto Elemento’s investigation into the Odebrecht corruption scandal, “the prosecutor offices said: ‘Yes, you can have it, only if you pay me, like, two million pesos.’” The reporters appealed to INAI, which concluded the documents should be given to them for free. Today, that is not an option, Talamantes tells us. INAI’s oversight of the right to public information access has now been transferred to a body within the Ministry of Anti-Corruption, raising serious concerns over its independence. INAI’s historical record, including the archive of past information requests and their corresponding responses, has “vanished into some cloud-based limbo, no longer accessible to the public,” says Saúl Rodriguez.

Judicial harassment is also taking a toll on Mexican media, Talamantes says.  According to Article 19,, between January 1 and July 31, 2025, there was a new judicial or administrative proceeding against journalists and media outlets every four days on average. Quinto Elemento has faced lawsuits in the past, though none in recent years, Talamantes says. Today, Quinto Elemento’s strategy to prevent legal challenges involves receiving legal advice from nonprofit organizations, like Article 19 and Propuesta Civica, while also participating “Reporters Shield”, a membership program that provides legal assistance and financial support to newsrooms facing lawsuits aimed at silencing their reporting.

Armando Talamantes, Executive Director of Quinto Elemento Lab. Photo: Courtesy of Armando Talamantes.

Zones of silence

In certain parts of Mexico, the pressures faced by journalists have taken an even more extreme form. Subjected to violence and intimidation, primarily by organized crime, reporters are forced to restrict or abandon the coverage of sensitive topics, like drug trafficking, altogether, a phenomenon known as “zones of silence”.

Subjected to violence and intimidation, primarily by organized crime, reporters are forced to restrict or abandon the coverage of sensitive topics, like drug trafficking, altogether, a phenomenon known as “zones of silence”.

Iguala, a city in the southwest state of Guerrero, has become a silent zone “on the one hand, due to the strong presence of organized crime, but on the other hand, also because of the collusion between government authorities and organized crime,” says Jonathan Cuevas, a journalist who has worked for both Mexican and international media and is based in the city, in a WhatsApp message to iMEdD. For the vast majority of journalists, this means refraining from covering topics that harm the interests of organized crime and, sometimes, certain public officials, according to Cuevas. “Self-censorship is mandatory for all of us,” he adds.

"Self-censorship is mandatory for all of us"

Jonathan Cuevas, Mexican Journalist

In the state of Sinaloa, in Northwestern Mexico, journalism is severely constrained in nearly half of the state’s territory and in some municipalities there are no local journalists at all, according to a 2025 study conducted by  Iniciativa Sinaloa, a non-profit civil organization based in Sinaloa’s capital, Culiacán. According to the official state version this is because of a lack of commercial interest in these municipalities, says Sibely Cañedo (Σιμπέλι Κανιέδο), Iniciativa Sinaloa’s project coordinator and a journalist living in the city of Mazatlán, speaking to iMEdD. Journalists and activists interviewed by Iniciativa Sinaloa, however, also point to the presence of organized crime as a major factor, she tells us.

A violent turf war that broke out in September 2024 between rival factions of one of the largest drug trafficking groups in the world, the Sinaloa Cartel, provides the latest context for the zone of silence in the area. The phenomenon is, however, much older. Cañedo traces it back at least to 2008, when another rupture within the Sinaloa Cartel triggered a surge in violence across the state. In Iguala, too, the zone of silence has a long history, existing long before Cuevas started working as a journalist in 2007, he tells us.

Sometimes, access to certain territories in Sinaloa is completely restricted. Journalists have been intercepted at illegal checkpoints guarded by armed groups forbidding their access, Cañedo tells us. Cañedo herself was unable to reach a community in Sinaloa’s northern municipality of Choix in July 2026, as no one was willing to take her there due to her work as a journalist. Even in Culiacán, where a certain degree of plurality is retained, reporters regularly resort to self-censorship when covering the activities of organized crime. “They can’t speak about the names of the criminal groups. They only refer to organized crime but don’t say ‘Los Chapitos’ or ‘La Mayiza’,” Cañedo notes in regard to the two rival factions within the Sinaloa cartel.

Consequences for those who continue to cover sensitive topics range from threats and beatings to displacement and murder, Cuevas tells us. He himself had to leave Iguala for Mexico City between 2020 and 2023 after receiving a series of texts and a call in October 2020, threatening to murder him and leave him “dismembered in the street or in some canal,” he tells iMEdD. He was forced to return to Iguala after losing up to 70% of his income due to his displacement.

In 2021, while in Mexico City, Iguala’s “municipal officials had asked an organized crime group to assassinate me and were offering the amount of 25,000 Mexican pesos, according to a series of screenshots sent to me via WhatsApp”, Cuevas tells us today. He believes this was related to his publications regarding financial irregularities in Iguala’s municipal government. Back in Guerrero, Cuevas’ family was being harassed and watched, “to the point where armed men intercepted my sister and her partner, threatened them, and gave them a message for me while pointing guns at their heads,” he recalls.

Jonathan Cuevas, at a protest he staged in Mexico City in September 2021, outside the Mexican government’s Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, publicly denouncing that Iguala’s municipal officials had asked organized crime to assassinate him. Photo: Courtesy of Jonathan Cuevas.

Zones of silence have disrupted the relationship between journalists and their audiences. “People don’t trust the media,” notes Aarón Ibarra, a freelance journalist based in Culiacán, speaking to iMEdD, as they suspect the media might be lying or even failing to cover certain issues altogether, he explains. For Hootsen, the consequences relate to democracy itself. “Whenever an election is coming up, it would be very good for voters to know if the candidates are corrupt on the take of organized crime. If critical journalism disappears, then you take that capacity for voters to know away because journalists are no longer covering it.”

Accountability or censorship?

In an already extremely dangerous environment for press freedom in Mexico, a new regulation aimed at protecting audience rights has opened up a different, institutional front. The set of regulations, titled the “General Guidelines for the Protection of Audience Rights,” was adopted in late August 2026 by Mexico’s Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (CRT) and, among other things, requires broadcasters to have complaint mechanisms and audience rights Ombudspersons in place. Although, following criticism, the final version of the rules is less restrictive than the one initially proposed by the Sheinbaum administration, the key question raised by the impending implementation of the new institutional framework appears to remain the same: how to ensure that efforts to strengthen media accountability do not become yet another means of exerting pressure on journalists.

Meanwhile, earlier in the summer, the Mexican government’s legal counsel, Luisa María Alcalde, presented a list of journalists, media outlets and opposition figures who the government claims attack the Sheinbaum administration. Saúl Rodriguez tells iMEdD that “it lists [the journalists’] full names and social media accounts, which makes them direct targets and makes it easier for people to attack them.”

Mexican journalism has proven to be incredibly resilient […] Journalists tend to be resilient, they tend to [be] very passionate about their work, they’re going to be very stubborn. The more you push them, the more they’ll start pushing back.

Jan-Albert Hootsen, CPJ’s Mexico representative

Yet, amid this evolving landscape of pressures “Mexican journalism has proven to be incredibly resilient,” Hootsen stresses. “Journalists tend to be resilient, they tend to [be] very passionate about their work, they’re going to be very stubborn. The more you push them, the more they’ll start pushing back. And it’s really hard for a government or for criminal networks to actually get rid of journalism altogether because they always come back.”

Ηow Mexican journalists protect themselves

Safety concerns have deterred Saúl Rodriguez from pursuing certain investigations. She tells us of the area of La Yesca and El Nayar in the western state of Nayarit, which has been “virtually abandoned by the government.” It relies on a single army outpost for protection, but when its personnel sometimes leave to collect supplies, local people are left vulnerable to robbery, murder and sexual violence by organized crime. Saúl Rodriguez has “seriously considered not going,” as the area is very remote, while some roads are controlled by organized crime, she says.

While Quinto Elemento’s team has not faced any threats or harassment lately, security remains a key consideration, especially for the freelancers whose investigations it supports. Protective measures range from communicating through Signal to conducting investigations during the day, without attracting much attention, as Talamantes tells us.

Two years ago, Quinto Elemento had to physically remove one of their reporters from the city she was working in to ensure her safety. The journalist had been investigating the involvement of public officials in the abuse of women inside a prison. “We took her out of the city a couple of days before the story would run,” Talamantes tells us.

Working with OCCRP, Saúl Rodriguez says, comes with constant security training and a series of protection measures. “They include everything from setting up a Signal chat and determining who will be tracking my movements day by day to checking in — depending on the area— every 15 minutes or every hour. […] I have to share my schedule second by second, so [that] they know where I am and can monitor me constantly,” she tells iMEdD.

Escamilla places particular emphasis on his sources’ protection, telling us he never films in their houses, preferring instead “neutral places,” like hotel rooms. Covering his sources’ characteristics, by using glasses or balaclavas for instance, is also a priority, he notes, stressing that this ensures not only his sources’ safety but also his own. If a source were to be identified “they are going to came after him and after that they are to come after me.”

This article first appeared on iMEdD and has been republished under a Creative Commons 4.0 International licence. We also gained permission from the author to use the images from the original piece.

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The Navy Kills Jesús González Peñuelas, "El Chuy," in Sinaloa

"Sol Prendido" for Borderland Beat

The federal government announced that this week, Secretary of Security Omar García Harfuch, Secretary of National Defense Ricardo Trevilla Trejo, and Secretary of the Navy Raimundo Morales will conduct supervisory visits to Sinaloa.

The agenda includes reviewing security deployments and assessing, firsthand, the needs of the state police, as well as those in Culiacán and Mazatlán—where the operation of the C4 (emergency command and control center) will also be evaluated.

They will visit the site selected for the construction of a new prison. It was later reported that the Secretary of National Defense inspected the conditions of the troops from the Third Military Region, based in Mazatlán. And why all this? Well, as you can see, the violence shows no signs of stopping.

In Sinaloa, local media have reported the murders of seven men and one woman over the last 24 hours. Five of these incidents occurred in Mazatlán, and three in Culiacán. This brings the total number of femicides in the state so far this month to 20. Furthermore, two of the victims were beheaded. One of the severed heads was left outside the Mazatlán City Hall—a municipality that has currently become the most violent area in Sinaloa.

Incidentally, also in Sinaloa, the death of a criminal leader from the "Chapo Isidro" faction was reported tonight; the United States had offered a $5 million reward for his capture. The individual is Jesús González Peñuelas, known as "Chuy González," who was killed during a confrontation with Navy personnel yesterday in Guasave—though his identity was only confirmed today. On May 20, the United States Department of the Treasury issued sanctions against Chuy González, whom it identified as being responsible for drug trafficking since 2007. He faces at least two indictments in California and Colorado.

Source: Milenio

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Ariadna Montiel's Meeting with El Guano

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

Chihuahua Governor Maru Campos stated in an interview with journalist Carlos Loret that a senior Morena official, Ariadna Montiel, has ties to organized crime—a claim she says she raised during a meeting with President Claudia Sheinbaum.

“Ariadna Montiel has a lot to explain and a lot to say regarding organized crime and these terrorist groups in the state of Chihuahua—specifically in Guadalupe y Calvo, in the Sierra Tarahumara, and in the municipality of Morelos, where a (drug) laboratory was recently dismantled. The mayor there is also from Morena,” Campos said.

According to security sources consulted by the columnist, this information stems from a federal report indicating that in early 2024—during the administration of former President AMLO—Montiel met in Guadalupe y Calvo with Aureliano Guzmán, known as “El Guano,” the brother of the notorious drug trafficker Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera.

The reports suggest that, during this meeting, an agreement was reached for the criminal group operating under “El Guano” in Chihuahua—known as “Los Salgueiro”—to intervene in that year’s elections by supporting Morena candidates, most of whom are linked to the criminal organization known as “La Línea.”

In exchange, “El Guano’s” associates would be permitted to maintain control over the territory stretching from La Tuna, in Sinaloa, to Moris, in Chihuahua.

The sources indicate that the directive given to “Los Guanos” was to shift their support away from their usual candidates and toward those from the Morena political party—specifically, to abandon Julio César Chávez Ponce (“El Chacho”) and instead back the current mayor, Ana Laura González Ábrego. According to reports, La Línea allegedly operated in Chihuahua in collusion with the mayor of Ciudad Juárez, Cruz Pérez Cuéllar—currently a Morena candidate for state governor—as well as with César Jáuregui, now labeled a “traitor to the homeland.” Jáuregui, who served as state prosecutor and was at one point a PAN candidate for mayor of the city of Chihuahua, is accused by these same sources of securing the release of members of that criminal group by intentionally mishandling case files—a practice for which payments of up to 10 million pesos were reportedly collected.

It was based on these reports, sources say, that Governor Campos leveled controversial accusations against the national president of Morena during a recent round of media interviews.

One high-level security source consulted for this column indicates that Juan Carlos Loera—the former federal delegate for development programs in Chihuahua—was even present at the meeting with “El Guano.” Loera, who previously had a falling out with Montiel (stating that he no longer even answers his phone calls), recently dismissed Campos’s statements as “slander and infamy.”

The political crisis triggered by the Chihuahua governor’s claims prompted a collective response from 24 governors affiliated with the Morena party. They attributed these "reckless accusations—intended to tarnish the honor of those who serve the nation"—to "frustration and political differences," and urged their colleagues to "continue moving forward with their heads held high."

Among the signatories are the governors of Baja California (Marina del Pilar Ávila), Guerrero (Evelyn Salgado), Michoacán (Alfredo Ramírez Bedolla), Tamaulipas (Américo Villarreal), Sonora (Alfonso Durazo), Zacatecas (David Monreal), Veracruz (Rocío Nahle), Campeche (Layda Sansores), Baja California Sur (Víctor Manuel Castro), and San Luis Potosí (José Ricardo Gallardo), among others.

Ariadna Montiel has acknowledged that during her time as a federal deputy—she was the first to leave the PRD to join Morena—and prior to the 2018 elections, Andrés Manuel López Obrador asked her to "focus on the northern part of the country, especially the Sierra Tarahumara." She lived there for two years, paving the way for Morena’s electoral growth in the region.

Following AMLO’s victory, she joined the administration as Undersecretary of Welfare, tasked with managing social programs. Later, upon the departure of Javier May, she was promoted to lead the secretariat—a position she eventually took over fully, succeeding Luisa Alcalde. Former Morena congresswoman Inés Parra intends to file a complaint against her with the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, alleging the diversion of 6 billion pesos.

Montiel is also alleged to have purchased—for a mere 99,000 pesos—a vast tract of land in Bocoyna (measuring 428,280 square meters; property record: 1864397) from Rafael Mata Márquez, the sub-delegate for the Secretariat of Welfare in Chihuahua.

Federal sources documented her alleged meeting and agreements with "El Guano." It is these same sources that prompted Campos to level the controversial accusation against her.

Ariadna Montiel

Source: El Universal

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Former Copalillo Official Accused of Extortion and Linked to Los Tlacos Is Arrested

"Sol Prendido" for Borderland Beat

The federal Security Cabinet confirmed the arrest of Samuel Benítez Cantorán—a former chief administrative officer (*oficial mayor*) of Copalillo and a former mayoral candidate—who is alleged to have ties to the criminal group "Los Tlacos," also known as the "Cártel de la Sierra."

Two others arrested during the operation

The arrest took place on October 23 in Iguala, Guerrero, during an operation involving personnel from the Army and the National Guard, in coordination with state authorities.

Along with Benítez Cantorán, two other men—identified as Pedro “N” and Heriberto “N”—were also arrested; they are likewise alleged to be members of this criminal organization.

During the operation, weapons, drugs, and cash were seized. The detainees and the confiscated items have been placed at the disposal of the competent judicial authority in Guerrero.

What is Samuel Benítez Cantorán accused of?

Investigations point to the former official as the alleged local leader (*jefe de plaza*) and financial operator for "Los Tlacos" in the municipality of Copalillo.

According to the investigations, Benítez Cantorán and the two other individuals arrested allegedly threatened and intimidated local merchants, forcing them to purchase basic food staples supplied by the group.

Authorities link this practice to a scheme designed to control and monopolize essential goods within the municipality of Copalillo.

In addition to the alleged extortion, the former *oficial mayor* (chief administrative officer) is also linked to potential homicide cases. These accusations will need to be clarified by the relevant authorities through ongoing investigations and judicial proceedings.

The arrest is part of security operations carried out in the state of Guerrero, targeting individuals suspected of involvement in criminal activities.

Who are "Los Tlacos," or the "Cártel de la Sierra" (Los de La Sierra)?

"Los Tlacos"—also known as the "Cártel de la Sierra"—are a criminal organization active in the state of Guerrero, with origins in Tlacotepec, in the municipality of General Heliodoro Castillo.

According to the group’s history, it began as a community police or "self-defense" (*autodefensa*) structure, claiming to protect local residents from other criminal organizations.

Over time, the group expanded its influence into the northern region of Guerrero and has since been linked to activities such as drug dealing, homicide, and the extortion of local merchants.

Arrest is part of state-level operations

The arrest of Samuel Benítez Cantorán and the two other men is part of ongoing operations by federal and state authorities in the region. Their alleged involvement with "Los Tlacos" and the specific crimes attributed to them will be determined as the legal process unfolds.

Samuel Benítez Cantorán

Editor’s Note: The Los Tlacos Cartel or Cartel de La Sierra is a criminal organization out of Guerrero that has no problems executing their enemies in large numbers  Their horrific ways were made to known to the world back in September 2021 when they captured, interrogated, and dismembered dozens of enslaved individuals afterward.

Sources: Uno Tv, Borderland Beat Archives

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In Contrast to the Rest of the Country, Perceptions of Safety are Low in Hermosillo and Nogales

"Sol Prendido" for Borderland Best

The perception of insecurity in Sonora hasn’t abated; on the contrary, two of its major cities—Hermosillo and Nogales—have seen an increase, reaching the highest level of perceived insecurity recorded so far this year.

This uptick in both cities runs counter to the national trend, where the perception of insecurity stood at 58.1 percent—a decrease of 1.7 percentage points compared to June 2026, marking the lowest level recorded since this survey began 13 years ago.

According to the National Survey of Urban Public Security (ENSU), conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi), Hermosillo experienced the largest increase in residents' feelings of insecurity between the second and third quarters of 2026. The percentage of inhabitants who consider living in the city to be unsafe rose from 43.2 percent to 53.2 percent—the highest level so far this year (following a 47.8 percent figure in the first quarter).

Key Data: According to Inegi’s ENSU, 58 percent of people aged 18 and older nationwide felt unsafe in September 2026, compared to 63 percent in September 2025.

The ENSU identifies Hermosillo as one of the urban areas that saw "statistically significant increases in the perception of insecurity between June and September 2026."

The security survey noted that, compared to June, 16 urban areas showed statistically significant changes: 10 recorded decreases, while six—including Hermosillo and Nogales—saw increases. In the case of Nogales, the perception of insecurity rose from 38.8% in the second quarter to 40.7% in the third—the highest level recorded so far this year, following a figure of 38.2% in the first quarter.

Another city in Sonora included in the INEGI’s assessment of perceived insecurity is Ciudad Obregón. Although it showed a decrease when comparing the first and third quarters, it remains the locality with the highest level of insecurity in the state, with 69.8% of residents reporting such feelings.

Ciudad Obregón also ranked above the national average of 58.1% and placed among the 20 most dangerous cities in the country to live in, according to its inhabitants.

The sense of insecurity in Hermosillo increased by 10%.

Nationwide, the survey revealed a gender-based disparity: 64.2% of women reported feeling unsafe in their city, compared to 50.6% of men.

In the case of Nogales, the perception of insecurity rose from 38.8% in the second quarter to 40.7% in the third—the highest level recorded so far this year, following a figure of 38.2% in the first quarter.

Another city in Sonora included in the INEGI’s assessment of perceived insecurity is Ciudad Obregón. Although it showed a decrease when comparing the first and third quarters, it remains the locality with the highest level of insecurity in the state, at 69.8%.

Ciudad Obregón also ranked above the national average of 58.1% and placed among the 20 most dangerous cities in the country to live in, according to its residents.

The sense of insecurity in Hermosillo grew by 10%.

Nationwide, the survey revealed a gender-based disparity: 64.2% of women reported feeling unsafe in their city, compared to 50.6% of men.

Regarding specific locations, 68.7% of respondents reported feeling unsafe at public ATMs; 61.8% on the streets; 61.1% on public transportation; and 55.3% on highways.

During the third quarter, 40.7% of those surveyed changed their habits regarding carrying valuables; 38.8% altered routines concerning allowing minors to go out unaccompanied; and 35.8% adjusted their habits regarding walking near their homes at night. The sense of insecurity felt by the people of Sonora aligns with the findings of the National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE), which recorded an increase in the percentage of households in the state of Sonora with at least one crime victim when comparing 2024 to 2025.

According to the ENVIPE, the estimated victimization rate in the state of Sonora for 2025 was 22,433 victims per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 23,260 victims in 2024.

The survey estimated that the victimization rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Sonora during 2025 was 23,778 for women and 20,910 for men; in 2024, the corresponding rates were 25,203 for women and 20,984 for men.

The results from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) also align with official figures; the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System reports an increase in Sonora—when comparing the first half of 2025 to the first half of 2026—in crimes such as femicide, small-scale drug dealing, domestic violence, and intentional bodily injury.

Specifically, femicide cases rose by 77 percent, increasing from 9 to 16, while small-scale drug dealing saw a 28 percent increase, rising from 2,547 to 3,264 cases. The crime of domestic violence saw a seven percent increase, rising from 2,663 to 2,872 cases, while intentional bodily injuries grew by 25 percent, increasing from 638 to 800 cases.

Source: La Razón

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Historic Drop in Perceived Insecurity Noted

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

The figure stands at 58.1 percent—the lowest level in 13 years—according to INEGI’s National Survey of Urban Public Security (ENSU). Claudia Sheinbaum has congratulated the Security Cabinet on these achievements. Nevertheless, six out of every 10 people in cities still feel unsafe; domestic violence affects 8.6% of urban households, with an increase observed among adults and older adults.

The perception of insecurity in Mexican cities decreased by 4.9 percentage points over the last year; however, more than half of the adult population still considers their place of residence to be dangerous. According to the National Survey of Urban Public Security (ENSU) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi), 58.1 percent of individuals aged 18 and older felt unsafe in September 2026, compared to 63 percent in the same month of 2025.

There are significant disparities between cities. Irapuato topped the list at 90.5 percent, followed by Chilpancingo (86.9), Mazatlán (85.8), Puebla (84.5), and Cuernavaca (83.1). Villahermosa, Culiacán, Reynosa, Guadalajara, and Uruapan also exceeded the 80 percent mark. At the opposite end of the spectrum were San Pedro Garza García, at 5.8 percent, and the Benito Juárez borough of Mexico City, at 13.8 percent.

Compared to June, 16 of the 91 cities evaluated showed statistically significant changes: in 10 cities, the perception of insecurity decreased, while in six, it increased. Hermosillo saw the largest rise, climbing from 43.2 to 53.2 percent. San Francisco de Campeche experienced the sharpest decline, dropping by 16.3 percentage points. Culiacán also showed improvement—moving from 90.8 to 81.6 percent—though it remains among the most insecure cities.

A gender gap persists. Among women, 64.2 percent feel unsafe in their city, compared to 50.6 percent among men. This sense of unease is present on public transport, at banks, on roads, and even within the home—where women, in particular, feel less secure (18.6% compared to 12.7%).

Broken down by city, Lázaro Cárdenas saw a 14.6-percentage-point increase in the perception of insecurity among women, while Cuajimalpa saw an 18.2-point decrease. Among men, Hermosillo recorded the largest increase—rising from 33.8% to 48.9%—while San Francisco de Campeche saw the largest reduction, at 17.7 percentage points.

Publicly accessible ATMs are the locations that generate the greatest sense of insecurity, cited by 68.7% of respondents. These are followed by streets and public transport, both of which were identified as unsafe by more than 60% of people. Near their homes, residents most frequently report public alcohol consumption, robberies or assaults, and the sale or use of drugs. Nearly a third of respondents mentioned frequent gunfire.

Compared to 2025, the proportion of people reporting frequent gunfire decreased by 2.8 percentage points. Conversely, the theft or illegal sale of fuel—known as *huachicol*—increased by 0.6 percentage points, reaching 3.6% over the same period.

Insecurity alters daily habits. Four out of every 10 people have stopped carrying valuables, and a similar proportion now restrict minors from going out unaccompanied—an indicator that rose by 1.9 percentage points over the course of a year. More than a third of people have stopped walking near their homes at night.

Nevertheless, issues related to public services remain a greater concern than crime. Potholes were cited by 83.1% of respondents, water leaks by six out of every 10 people, and clogged storm drains by more than half. Crime ranked fourth, at 49.9 percent—down from the 52.6 percent recorded in June.

The Navy, the Army, and the Air Force are the best-rated security institutions, each scoring above 80 percent. The National Guard received 73.5 percent, while state and municipal police forces scored between 50 and 56 percent. Reynosa stood out regarding its municipal police force, for which the perceived level of effectiveness rose from 38.4 to 56 percent.

Regarding the future, opinions are divided: 23.7 percent believe that security will improve, while 22.6 percent believe it will worsen.

CSP acknowledges the work of her cabinet in light of the results.

President Claudia Sheinbaum congratulated the Security Cabinet on the decline in the public’s perception of insecurity, as reported by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).

Following the announcement that this indicator had dropped by 4.9 percentage points—according to the National Survey of Urban Public Security (ENSU)—the President noted that this marks the lowest level seen in the last 13 years.

“It is the lowest point since the survey began 13 years ago. In other words, people feel safer—according to the INEGI, based on a survey that has been conducted in the same manner for 13 years. The decline was more pronounced among men, while women still report a higher perception of insecurity,” she stated.

Nevertheless, she remarked that there is still more work to be done. In the meantime, she commended the authorities involved in these efforts.

23.7 percent believe the security situation will improve.

“Today, I offered my sincere congratulations to the Security Cabinet for this result, as well as to everyone carrying out operational duties—the Secretariat of Security, the Secretariat of National Defense, the Navy, and the National Guard,” she said.

She also highlighted the role of the Secretariat of the Interior, specifically regarding its program to address the root causes of violence—an initiative focused on steering young people away from violence and fostering their development.

“The Secretariat of the Interior also deserves recognition, as the coordination of the program addressing root causes contributes to this shift in perception. It is a matter of continuing to work every day to make further progress in reducing crime rates, and consequently, the sense of insecurity that people feel on the streets of their cities,” she said.

The President noted that, in the case of Mexico City, all of the city’s boroughs (alcaldías) were included in the study. In this context, she urged the public to join the strategy against insecurity by reporting illicit acts. 

Family Violence Affects 8.6% of Households in the Country

Violence within the family environment affected 8.6 percent of urban households in the country over the past year—a proportion virtually the same as that of the previous period—though minors were among the victims in a quarter of the homes where such aggression occurred, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi).

Data from the latest quarter of the National Urban Public Security Survey (ENSU) show that 25.5 percent of households experiencing violence included victims under the age of 18, compared to 23.8 percent in the prior period. The overall prevalence increased by one-tenth of a percentage point between the two periods, which span from October to September of each year.

The percentage of adults who experienced some form of aggression in this environment also saw a slight increase—by three-tenths of a percentage point—reaching 7.9 percent. The disparity by gender was more pronounced among women (9.2 percent), whose rate rose by nearly a full percentage point, while the rate for men (6.3 percent) remained virtually unchanged.

Key Fact: The Secretariat for Women reported a 36% decrease in the daily average of femicides, and noted that risk situations were identified in 33% of calls made to the 079 emergency line.

The presence of children and adolescents among the victims aligns with an issue documented in academic research, which draws on hospital records and studies regarding the consequences of violence during childhood. A study published in the scientific journal *BMC Public Health* examined 116,287 medical records of minors who received care for interpersonal violence at public health institutions in Mexico between 2015 and 2022. The study found that 57.1 percent of these cases involved aggression within the family environment.

Magdalena Gruendl, Diana D. del Valle, and seven other researchers identified significant differences based on the sex of the victims. Girls and female adolescents accounted for 68.7 percent of the recorded cases, while males made up 66.1 percent of the perpetrators. The analysis also revealed a higher prevalence of sexual and psychological abuse among women, whereas physical injuries were more common among men.

The consequences are explored in a study by Clara Strasser Ceballos and Anna-Carolina Haensch, published on September 30 in the *Journal of Computational Social Science*. Drawing on data from over 61,000 women and various statistical sources, the researchers identified a link between a history of childhood maltreatment and the risk of experiencing psychological abuse from an intimate partner in adulthood.

The study found that women who had been subjected to abuse during childhood were, on average, 5.1 percentage points more likely to experience such maltreatment as adults compared to those without such a history, even after accounting for other factors in the model. The research also identified an increased risk among individuals whose partners had been exposed to violence during their own childhoods.

Both experts emphasized the importance of examining childhood experiences when studying intimate partner violence. They found that women who possessed greater autonomy—specifically regarding professional decision-making and the management of their own financial resources—were less likely to experience psychological abuse.

In the most recent assessment by the INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography), verbal abuse and humiliation were the most frequently reported forms of mistreatment among adults, with a prevalence of five percent—the same figure as in 2025. However, a breakdown by sex reveals shifts during this period: the percentage rose from 5.9 percent to 6.3 percent among women, while it fell from 4.0 percent to 3.5 percent among men.

Other behaviors documented by the agency include threats of eviction from the home, physical blows, and non-consensual sexual touching. Physical assaults affected 1.9 percent of the female population and 1.5 percent of the male population, while rape or attempted rape reached a prevalence of 0.5 percent among women and 0.1 percent among men.

Another shift is seen in the identification of romantic partners as the primary perpetrators of domestic violence. Their share among the aggressors identified by adult victims rose from 19.5 percent in the 2025 survey to 21.1 percent in the current edition. For women, this figure reached 24.9 percent—nearly a quarter of those who reported abuse within that context.

The report also identifies siblings, parents, and other relatives among the primary aggressors. However, the most frequent category consists of individuals with no specified familial relationship, accounting for 48.9 percent of the reported cases.

According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), violence against children and adolescents also encompasses disciplinary practices such as shouting, humiliation, and physical punishment. The organization notes that more than half of all children have experienced violent child-rearing methods at home, though this figure is derived from a different measurement than the one used in the ENSU.

The organization warns that abuse within the home constitutes “a violation of children’s rights which, although occurring in the private sphere, affects the entire community.” It also identifies the strengthening of protection systems, the promotion of positive parenting, and shifts in social norms as key measures for preventing such behavior.

Source: La Razón

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Survivors Recount 22 Days of Kidnapping and Torture in Guerrero

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

A week after six of the seven people kidnapped in Ajuchitlán del Progreso, Guerrero, were found alive, they continue to suffer the aftereffects of the nightmare they endured for 22 days. One of the victims recounted his experience to *Milenio*, beginning with his abduction on September 24, while he and others were heading to work in the fields near the rural community of El Balcón. 

"Look, the day they grabbed us—they caught us at a place called 'La Mesa de las Yeguas'—there were about 80 gunmen. They took us, loaded us into a pickup truck, and moved us toward a town called Los Orcones. There were another 200 gunmen there." 

The victim stated that the group was ultimately taken to the municipality of Arcelia, with the criminals traveling exclusively along back trails. Although the exact location was not disclosed, the captives were locked away and told the reason for their abduction: "I’m going to kill everyone from the El Balcón *ejido* [communal landholding] because I want your land. You have a forest—it’s clear you take good care of it; it’s dense with pine trees. I’m going to become a millionaire by taking your timber, and I’ll kill anyone who stands in my way." 

During those harrowing days, they were tortured and given only one tortilla a day to eat. It was through this detail that they discovered dozens of other people being held captive alongside them. 

"When we arrived in Arcelia, there were elderly women, young girls of 16 or 17, men, elderly men, and even children—some as young as 12. We figured out how many of us there were by counting the tortillas; there were 136 of us in total." 

This account concerns Domingo Atanasio Quirino, 50—the only one of the seven who wasn’t released. The victim states that the torture he endured left him in a very poor condition, and that at one point he was taken away, and they were told he had died. Days later, the story changed; they heard he had been taken to a hospital. The man began to lose consciousness. They could hear him being dragged out, as he was unable to walk. 

About an hour later, someone came to inform them: "The companion who was with you has passed away." Later, another member of their group fell ill and ended up in a hospital in Arselia—taken there by their captors. While there, the gunman accompanying the man mentioned that Domingo—the companion who had been taken away—was in that same hospital, recovering from numerous injuries and remaining in poor health. 

However, no one ever saw Domingo again. Their captors also claimed that Jordi Alberto Atanasio Vidal—the 12-year-old boy who had been the first to be released, in early October—had died; this was clearly intended to further terrorize them. Regarding the boy who had been released, they told us he had been killed, while other accounts suggested he was already back with his family. 

We were left in doubt as to whether he was still alive, sometimes fearing, "No, he must be dead, and they’re just going to kill us off one by one." After 22 days, they were finally released. They believe that the widespread publicity surrounding their kidnapping made their captors nervous, leading them to say, "Well, we’re going to set you free. We’ll even give you a pickup truck so you can leave—but you’ll have to go just as you’re dressed now." (They had been dressed in military-style clothing by their captors.) Today, the kidnapping victims and their families want only one thing: help from the Mexican government to obtain asylum in the United States. Only there, they assert, will they be able to feel safe.

Source: Milenio

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Unstoppable Violence in Michoacán: 31 Police Officers Killed, and Criticism of the Government Mounts

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

Attacks against police officers in Michoacán continue. Two more officers have been killed in recent days, bringing the total number of police deaths in the state so far this year to 31. An armed attack resulted in the deaths of two more police officers in Michoacán. This brings the total number of security personnel who have lost their lives to 31, making it the state with the second-highest number of police killings. 

According to statistics from the organization *Causa en Común*, this situation has alarmed the public, who see these homicides as a reflection of the insecurity prevailing in Michoacán under the administration of Governor Alfredo Ramírez Bedoya. 

"People often say that Michoacán and Morelia are somewhat dangerous places. I don’t think this is an isolated incident—sadly, I believe it’s a national issue—but it certainly reflects the reality we all live in. If our officials—the very people meant to protect us—cannot even defend themselves, then it inevitably affects us, the ordinary citizens." 

Criminal groups have taken the lives of dozens of police officers in Michoacán through ambushes, attacks on operational bases, and assaults during security patrols—all while the Ramírez Bedoya administration fails to take any action. 

"You’re not safe anywhere here anymore—not at home, not on the street. You might leave the house, but you never know if you’ll make it back. We need more security for society, don't we? As for the governor? I’d ask him to support us, because life here has become extremely violent—there’s intense violence everywhere. It’s terrible for the public; we already lack security, and with officers being murdered, how are we supposed to go about our lives on the streets?" 

Organized crime has left a trail of murdered police officers across various municipalities—most recently in Jacona, where two officers lost their lives. In Nahuatzen, an armed attack claimed the lives of five officers. Other cities, such as Apatzingán, Morelia, Zamora, Buenavista, and Coahuayana, have also seen police officers killed. 

In the eyes of the public, the administration of Alfredo Ramírez Bedoya has failed to put an end to these killings—a situation that also puts the entire population at risk, as many believe these murders signify a state effectively governed by organized crime. 

“People live in fear and uncertainty, yet the governor does nothing; the government does nothing”.

Source: ADN Noticias

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A Total of 13 Mass Graves Have Been Found in Viesca Containing the Charred Remains of Men and Women

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

A total of 13 burial pits—containing the remains of what are presumed to be 13 individuals, both men and women—have been located at a site in the Salitrillo Dunes, in the municipality of Viesca. Members of the group "Grupo Vida" have been searching the area since September 1st and intend to continue in the coming days, weather permitting.

Among the items recovered from this vast expanse of land—a site recently brought to the group's attention—are fragments of skulls, phalanges, and ribs, as well as orthodontic hardware, such as dental braces, which could potentially aid in identifying the remains.

However, according to Silvia Ortiz, the group’s founder, many of the recovered remains are charred, which will likely make identification impossible. Nevertheless, there is hope that some of the better-preserved fragments may yield enough material for DNA analysis.

“There are many pieces, but they have to be in very good condition to have any chance of yielding DNA… we’ve found dental work, which is helpful—it provides a lead, as we can then check which missing persons had such dental work.”

Conditions similar to those at Patrocinio

Silvia Ortiz noted that the site, located about 70 kilometers from Torreón, shares conditions similar to those found at the Patrocinio *ejido* (communal land). In that case, remains had been incinerated using diesel or other fuels—a method employed by criminal groups in an attempt to make bodies disappear.

According to Ortiz—the mother of Stephanie Sánchez Viesca, known as "Fanny," who has been missing since November 5, 2004, in Torreón—13 burial pits containing the remains of 13 people have been discovered so far.

Although no clothing has been found that would definitively indicate the gender of the individuals, the discovery of items such as hooks or underwire—likely from a bra—suggests that at least one of the victims was a woman.

Rain has hindered the search

The rain has prevented further progress. Just two or three weeks ago, the search was called off on the third day after a storm caught the searchers—along with the authorities accompanying them—by surprise.

The same thing happened the following week; therefore, for the next search—which they hope will begin this coming Monday—they are counting on the weather to allow them to make progress.

“We’ll see what it’s like; sometimes the locations catch us off guard—what I mean is, we might arrive and it’s not raining, so we’ll just have to see how it goes.”

Sources: El Siglo de Torreón, Borderland Beat Archives

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El Taliban Fell In Mazatlán... And What He Confessed Ties Everything Together

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

“Sinaloa is a priority for the government of Mexico; it is a priority for the President of Mexico. The security cabinet has instructed us to maintain a permanent oversight of the operations being carried out in Sinaloa”. 

October 16, 2026, marks the beginning of the downfall of "El Talibán." A series of operations in Sinaloa began to reveal the movements of an alleged criminal cell linked to "Los Chapitos" faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. At the center of the investigations is an individual known as "El Talibán," who is identified as a trusted associate of a regional leader within this faction of the Sinaloa Cartel—a man also allegedly connected to the kidnapping and murder of 10 mine workers.

According to the Secretariat of National Defense, the capture of "El Talibán" took place on October 17, 2026, in the municipality of Mazatlán, following a series of military intelligence efforts that led authorities to suspected members of this criminal organization.

The detainee was found in possession of weapons and a vehicle. Authorities identified him as a close associate of Juan Benito "N"—known as "El Beni 17"—who is alleged to be a regional leader for "Los Chapitos." However, his arrest wasn’t an isolated event. A day earlier, on October 16, federal and state authorities carried out an operation in the municipality of El Rosario. There, they apprehended four suspected members of a criminal cell that, according to investigations, was part of the security detail for Óscar Luciano "N"—known as "Casco" or "El 81"—who is identified as the regional leader of this same faction.

Among those detained is a Colombian national. During both operations, authorities seized weapons and tactical gear, while intelligence efforts provided further insight into the activities of this criminal network. Intelligence gathered has allowed for progress in the investigation into the activities of this criminal network. Furthermore, the case of the 10 miners looms over this cell.

The investigation has taken on a more serious dimension due to the allegations against those arrested. According to the Secretariat of National Defense, these individuals are believed to be linked to the kidnapping and murder of 10 workers from the mining company Canam Vizsla Silver Corporation, which occurred on January 23, 2026, in La Concordia, Sinaloa. Initial statements from the detainees suggest that the victims were mistaken for members of a rival group.

These are the initial statements; we expect more information to emerge, and, naturally, more arrests are likely to follow. In this regard, have mining companies in general—not just in Sinaloa—reached out to you, or have you received any information suggesting they are being extorted, or that their personnel or the companies themselves are being intimidated? In this specific case, we had not previously received any report or complaint indicating that they were being extorted or that any member of this company had been harassed by a criminal group.

We had no prior record of this. The case sent shockwaves through the mining sector and raised questions about the operations of criminal groups in this region. Now, the arrest of these members of the "Chapitos" organization could provide new information to help clarify what happened—though, of course, their specific culpability will have to be determined through the corresponding investigations. And the list of incidents under investigation doesn’t end there.

These members of the cell are also linked to the kidnapping of four tourists from the State of Mexico, which took place on February 3, 2026, in Mazatlán, Sinaloa. On that occasion, a group of six tourists from the State of Mexico were riding in rented all-terrain vehicles—specifically "Razor" models—when they were intercepted by a group of armed men. Hours after the kidnapping, a woman and a minor were released, safe and sound, in the community of El Aval.

However, four men from the same family were held captive by these criminals. Since the abduction, the kidnappers haven’t made any calls demanding a ransom. 

"Listen... your parents are fighting for you. Listen, your parents are fighting for you. Javier, listen—they are fighting for you." 

In reality, the operations carried out on October 16 and 17 were the result of military intelligence work and coordination between federal and state security forces. The capture of "El Talibán" opens a new line of investigation into the regional structure of the "Chapitos" in Sinaloa. Authorities are seeking to clarify the links between those arrested and the acts of violence attributed to them, while the true extent of this network—and its potential connections to other criminal leaders—remains an open question.

Source: La Saga

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This Is How the MataZetas Captured and Executed the Zetas

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

Which organization do you belong to? The "Zetas." How long have you been with this group? About two and a half years. Tell me how you joined...

There was a time when the *Zetas* were untouchable. Hardly anyone dared to confront them, but then a group emerged that wasn't afraid of them. The *MataZetas* ("Zeta-killers") claim to be ordinary people who had simply grown tired—but the truth is something else. Today, I’ll tell you how they hunted them down, how they marked them, and how that group eventually became something even more powerful.

Stay tuned, because this is going to shock you. It all began around 2011. Back then, the *Zetas* were expanding unchecked; having broken away from the Gulf Cartel, they were seizing territory across the country—Tamaulipas, Veracruz, San Luis Potosí, Coahuila, Nuevo León—and even reaching states like Quintana Roo and Zacatecas.

Their *modus operandi* was unlike anything seen before. They didn't just traffic drugs; they involved themselves in all sorts of illegal activities—extortion, kidnapping, fuel theft, human trafficking—imposing their own brutal law wherever they went. Faced with such immense power, something new appeared. In the very areas where the *Zetas* operated, messages began to circulate, signed by a group calling themselves the *MataZetas*.

At first, they claimed to be ordinary townspeople—neighbors fed up with the relentless violence who had banded together for self-defense. But soon, questions arose: how could regular people possibly take on one of the best-armed and best-trained criminal groups in Mexico? Where were they getting the money, the weapons, and the intelligence needed to track them down—in places where no one else could?

Strong rumors began to spread that the Sinaloa Cartel was behind them. The reason was clear: the *Zetas* had become their greatest obstacle to moving freely throughout the country. It is said that the Sinaloa Cartel supported local groups—longtime enemies of the Zetas—to fight against them. But what many don’t realize is that, over time, these groups became independent.

They no longer answered to anyone but themselves. From that independence—and from an alliance originally forged to destroy a common enemy—emerged what we know today as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the formidable CJNG. What began as a response to the Zetas eventually transformed into one of the largest criminal organizations in the country.

In a sense, then, something was born out of that dark war that completely altered Mexico’s criminal landscape. Capturing a Zeta was no easy task; knowing they had many enemies, they lived with extreme caution. They frequently changed residences, avoided using the same phone for long, steered clear of predictable routes, and kept their destinations secret—often, even their own family members didn’t know their whereabouts.

So, how did the *MataZetas* ("Zeta-killers") manage to track them down? The key wasn’t weaponry, but intelligence. They built an extensive, discreet network of informants. People within the neighborhoods, at local markets, and along transport routes would tip them off—reporting, for instance, "I just saw that vehicle they always use," or "They’re gathering at that house at a certain time," or "They head out to the corner store in the morning." They also received information from victims of the Zetas—people who had been extorted, relatives of kidnapping victims, or simply those who wanted to see the Zetas fall. All this information was gathered and cross-referenced, gradually piecing together the puzzle: who lived where, whom they met with, when they left the house, and how many guards were protecting them. Once they knew a target’s location, they didn’t strike immediately.

They would study their movements for days. They knew when their targets were alone, when they were accompanied, and when they were most off-guard; and when they decided to act, they did so with great speed. They would strike at night or at times when they knew fewer people would be around—sometimes arriving in disguise, or simply relying on the element of surprise. Often, the capture took place without a single shot being fired, as the element of surprise was their greatest weapon; once they had their targets under control, they would take them to a remote location.

This is where the darkest part of it all began. Once they had their prisoners, the *MataZetas*—the "Zeta-killers"—would do something that became their signature: they would either dress them in a white or light-colored shirt with the letter "Z" printed on the chest, or use a sharp, pointed object—like a pocketknife or a blade—to carve the letter directly into the victim’s skin. The letter "Z" was no coincidence; it was a way of saying, "We know who you are, we know where you come from, and now you are in our hands."

It served as both a mark of humiliation and a warning. In videos that circulated online, one could see the types of tools they had at their disposal. They didn’t just carry firearms; they were seen with large axes, double-edged machetes, knives of various sizes, and—in some cases—chainsaws. These were heavy, conspicuous tools that, in themselves, gave a clear idea of ​​what they were capable of doing.

They made no effort to hide them; rather, they displayed them intentionally to instill fear. What struck those who watched these videos most was the presence of large, dark-colored drums in the background. Based on their appearance—and the rumors circulating at the time—these containers held some form of acid or corrosive substance, used to dissolve bodies and make them vanish without a trace. Simply seeing them there was enough to sow terror.

All of this was part of a calculated strategy. They didn’t just want to eliminate their enemies; they wanted everyone to know what awaited them if they remained on the wrong side. They rarely killed their captives immediately; they needed information, and that information was just as valuable as the capture itself. Each person who fell into their hands could potentially lead them to two, three, or even more key figures within the *Zetas* organization.

The interrogations were never improvised. They knew exactly what they wanted to find out. First, names and positions: "Who was your direct boss? Who gave you your orders?" To whom did you report? Who were the people working with you? Did you know leaders from other areas? Sometimes, a single name could open the door to an entire cell. Second, locations and hideouts: Where did the leaders live? Which safe houses did they use? Where did they store heavy weapons? Where did they hide money or drugs? Where did they gather for important meetings?

With this information, they could raid locations and seize assets without anyone noticing. Third, routes and movements: What paths did they use to enter or leave the area? What vehicles did they use, and when? How often did the leaders travel to other territories? What phones did they use, and with whom did they communicate most frequently? This allowed them to set up ambushes or identify when an area was left unprotected. It is known that some prisoners talked quickly out of fear, while others spoke in the hope that cooperating would spare their lives.

Some managed to remain silent for hours or days before saying anything. But the saddest part is that, in most cases, the information they provided bought them only a temporary reprieve—it almost never saved their lives. Once they had nothing left to say, their fate—already determined beforehand—would be sealed. After gathering all the information, a decision was made. It was not a random process; each person was evaluated based on several specific criteria.

If you were a recent recruit—someone who didn’t issue orders but merely followed basic instructions—you were more likely to be spared. If, however, you were a squad leader, a regional commander, or someone who understood the entire organizational structure, there was virtually no mercy. The extent of the harm you had caused was the deciding factor: if you had ordered executions, kidnappings, or acts of extortion, your fate was almost certainly the worst possible outcome. If you had merely been involved, without having issued serious orders, your situation might be viewed differently. 

There was also the question of whether you might prove useful—or dangerous—in the future. If they let you go, would you return to the *Zetas* to seek revenge? Did you know too much about them—or about your captors—to be allowed to walk free? If the answer was yes, it was highly unlikely they would let you go. In some cases, individuals deemed low-level were released with a very clear warning: leave this area and do not return. If we see you again, there will be no second chance. This wasn’t an act of kindness; it was a strategy. 

Those who were released—or sent away—carried with them both fear and a message: "They know who we are, they know where we are, and they are coming for all of us." In this way, terror spread without a single shot being fired. But for those who held high-ranking positions, the decision was final. They knew too much and had caused too much harm; letting them go would have put the entire organization at risk. 

There was no negotiation, no forgiveness—they knew their time had come. While these events usually took place in remote locations, that wasn’t always the case. Often, the *MataZetas*—the "Zeta-killers"—chose to make a far more striking statement. They would leave bodies in plain sight: on major highways, at the entrances to cities, on pedestrian bridges, or even in public squares. This was not done out of gratuitous cruelty. 

It was a warning directed at everyone—but, above all, at the other members of the *Zetas*. They were essentially saying, "This is what awaits all of you." One of the most horrific and memorable incidents took place in Boca del Río, in the state of Veracruz. In that area, 35 bodies were left in plain sight, in a busy, high-traffic location. The news spread across the entire country, as no one could believe what they were seeing.

It was one of the most extreme displays of its kind at the time, marking a very dark chapter for the state of Veracruz. The image remained etched in the memories of many Mexicans, illustrating the extreme lengths to which the war between criminal groups had escalated. What was most unsettling was not just the act itself, but the cold-blooded, calculated manner in which it was carried out.

This was not a spontaneous outburst of rage; it was a premeditated act, designed to send a message. When a group saw their own associates left in such a state, fear took hold of everyone. Trust vanished, no one felt safe, and the organization began to weaken from within—which was precisely the intended outcome. Over the years, the situation evolved; what began as a reactionary group formed to counter "Los Zetas" did not disappear—instead, it grew and transformed.

"Los MataZetas" (the "Zeta-Killers") evolved, became better organized, and eventually transformed into what we now know as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). From a group that emerged to fight a common enemy, they developed into an independent organization that now operates across multiple Mexican states and several other countries. Thus, from this conflict between criminal factions, something even larger and more powerful emerged.

And therein lies the most important lesson: responding to violence with more violence solves nothing. It merely shifts the power dynamic—changing who is on top and who is at the bottom. The group that was originally formed to put an end to the terror inflicted by "Los Zetas" eventually became an organization in its own right, wielding its own power and controlling its own territory. There was no happy ending, no winner who brought peace; there was only a shift in power and many broken families on both sides.

Source: MrCreppBoyy

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Captain Sol: The Ghost Who Controlled Customs and Ran the Government's Illegal Fuel Trade

“Sol Prendido” for Borderland Beat 

He was nicknamed "The Ghost" because, despite holding no formal position, he became the true boss of the country’s customs service. According to the statement of a cooperating witness, even the Secretary of the Navy could not remove him. During the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, he effectively held more power than the official heads of customs—Horacio Duarte, Rafael Marín Mollinedo, and Andrés George Fulón—all without them supposedly even realizing it.

His name is Miguel Ángel Solano Ruiz, better known as "Captain Sol." The Attorney General’s Office (FGR) identifies him as the operational and financial mastermind behind a "fiscal fuel-smuggling" network—a scheme that, between 2023 and 2025, allegedly siphoned approximately 600 billion pesos from the public treasury. Evidence suggests he acted as the key link, connecting funds from importers of illegal fuel to naval and civilian personnel working at ports and customs facilities.

However, "The Ghost’s" operations would have been impossible without the solid foundation of protection he secured from above—from the very highest echelons of the state. How did Captain Sol become the primary operator of this web of corruption? Who, or what group, allowed him to wield such power? One name that appears repeatedly in investigations and testimonies held by the FGR is that of Andy López Beltrán.

Testimonies gathered by the investigative unit of Azteca Noticias describe Solano Ruiz as a quiet, almost timid man—someone capable of remaining unnoticed while possessing exceptional intelligence. He was born in a small town in the municipality of Tierra Blanca, Veracruz, and grew up in a large family with three siblings, living without any luxuries.

In 1994, he entered the Heroic Naval Military School, where he distinguished himself through his academic performance. After spending several years at sea, he was recruited into the intelligence divisions of the Secretariat of the Navy—the branch from which the Naval Intelligence Unit (UIN) would eventually emerge. Naval intelligence is credited with playing a pivotal role in operations against major drug trafficking kingpins, such as Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano, and Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán.

Due to his performance, the Navy assigned him to the Attorney General’s Office (PGR)—first to the National Center for Planning, Analysis, and Information for Combating Crime (CENAPI), and later to the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime Investigation (SEIDO). His twisted career path offers a lesson that cannot be overlooked: the alleged mastermind behind one of the largest frauds ever committed in Mexico was an operative trained by the state itself to combat its most dangerous criminals.

The betrayal by "El Fantasma" (The Ghost) is more than just a personal anecdote; it exposes the failure of institutions that end up creating the very monsters that later inflict harm upon society. This case is reminiscent of the "ETAs"—elite Mexican military personnel, some of whom were trained in the United States—who also served within the PGR before crossing the line into illegality to join the Gulf Cartel, then led by Osiel Cárdenas Guillén.

For several years, Miguel Ángel Solano’s superior was Gustavo Salas, who headed both CENAPI and, subsequently, SEIDO. It is likely that, during this time, "El Fantasma" identified the state’s vulnerabilities and the most lucrative criminal enterprises. Among these, he discovered one that, at first glance, appeared less serious than others: it did not involve the trafficking of drugs, weapons, or human beings, but rather something simpler—fuel smuggling.

If one manages to pass off gasoline or diesel—which are subject to high excise taxes—as additives or lubricants, which are taxed at a much lower rate, the profit potential is enormous. Selling these products multiplies the profit margin. All signs point to "Captain Sol" switching sides in 2017. This coincided with the departure of Gustavo Salas; Salas left his post in December 2016, while Solano resigned from the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) in February 2017, retiring from the Navy shortly thereafter.

Between May and June of this year, a series of companies emerged that appear to have served as vehicles for this operation, including Gersap Transportes, Marapú Ingeniería, Saenmar, Aliso Valle Constructora, and Comercializadora Industrial Comp. All were established using "straw men"—very young individuals with virtually no prior business experience.

The next step, facilitated by Climacoalda Peutrera—a classmate from the Heroic Naval Academy—was to bring in the brothers Manuel Roberto and Fernando Farías Laguna. They are the nephews-in-law of Admiral Rafael Ojeda, who served as Secretary of the Navy during the López Obrador administration. According to the Attorney General’s Office (FGR), the head of the Navy (SEMAR) entrusted key departmental decisions to these relatives, including the appointment of naval personnel to strategic positions within the customs service—an operation that was transferred to the Navy in 2020.

At the same time, this shadowy figure incorporated Humberto Enrique López Arellano—the director of maritime customs supervision at the National Customs Agency (ANAM)—into his network, as well as, in all likelihood, López Arellano’s superior, Felipe Solano Armenta, the Director General of Customs Operations. It is also possible that he had the support of former acquaintances from the old Attorney General’s Office (PGR). 

A cooperating witness recounts that when a ship loaded with diesel was docked at the port of Guaymas, Solano claimed he had already spoken with his superiors to ensure that the Sonora Prosecutor’s Office would not intervene. The testimony doesn’t clarify whether it was the State Prosecutor’s Office—headed by Gustavo Salas—or the local branch of the FGR (Federal Attorney General’s Office) in that state. Looking at the network as a whole, it is difficult to believe that a single man could have placed himself above so many institutions—including the Secretariat of the Navy, the National Customs Agency, port authorities, and various prosecutor’s offices.

Who else did "The Ghost" bring into his operation? According to cooperating witnesses, in addition to the Farías brothers, Captain Sol would often invoke "Andy"—the nickname for Andrés Manuel López Beltrán, the former president’s son—as his protector. López Beltrán has defended himself by arguing that the mere mention of a name is not proof of the truth. He may well be right, but the more interesting question is something else.

Why did "The Ghost"—who is said to be quite brilliant—choose to invoke this specific relative of the former president, rather than some other figure from the country’s political elite? One possibility is that the account is actually credible. López Beltrán has a reputation for conducting business under the umbrella of his father’s power. Another detail lends weight to this suspicion: Amil Carolan.

Carolan—at the time a very close friend of López Beltrán—has been implicated by U.S. authorities due to his ties to Portacelis, a company linked to "fiscal *huachicol*" (fuel-related tax fraud). Furthermore, the investigation into Portacelis coincides with the revocation of López Beltrán’s U.S. visa. As the Italian saying goes: *se non è vero, è ben trovato*—even if it isn’t true, it certainly seems plausible.

"The Ghost" couldn’t have gone so far with only the backing of Admiral Ojeda’s nephews. Someone higher up must have assisted him. It remains to be seen whether Captain Sol will dare to reveal who—or what group—helped him tear a massive hole in the country’s public institutions, enabling the extraction of billions of pesos in record time.

Source: ADN Noticias y Azteca Noticias

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